Lana Kühle

Illinois State University, Philosophy, Faculty Member

I am an associate professor in the department of philosophy at Illinois State University. I completed my PhD in 2014 at the University of Toronto under the supervision of Evan Thompson.

My research is framed by an embodied mind view and is aimed at exploring our sense of self and the subjectivity of consciousness from within such a paradigm. To be aware of one’s ‘self’ involves being aware of one’s body. That is, our sense of self is tied to our sense of our body, i.e. bodily awareness. Moreover, our sense of self is ever-present in our conscious mental lives — there is always a subject of consciousness present. Given the key role occupied by the ‘self’ in consciousness, accounting for our bodily awareness becomes necessary if we are to give a comprehensive account of consciousness from an embodied mind viewpoint. To date, this has not been accomplished. Providing just such an account is my ultimate research goal.

To be sure, bodily awareness involves being aware of having control, or agency over my body. And, certainly, I’m aware that this body is mine. However, neither of these forms of bodily awareness explain how it is that my body presents itself as my self. By this I mean the following: when I’m not thinking about whether this body is mine, or about whether I’m the agent of an action, I nonetheless continue to experience my body as present in my conscious awareness. That is, my body never disappears — I never become disembodied. The body’s presence, in this fundamental manner, is one that lies beyond a sense of ownership or agency. I am my body, and so long as I am conscious, then my body is there for me — my body is my self. In this sense, the body is the very subject of experience — a sense of pure bodily subjectivity. This bodily subjectivity is the fundamental basis for our sense of self, and as such, understanding bodily subjectivity is key to understanding consciousness from an embodied mind perspective. Sadly, it also remains insufficiently explored and unexplained. My research aims to rectify this lacuna.

My research coalesces around the following three questions:
1. What, more precisely, is bodily subjectivity — how should we define it?
2. What kind of experience is our experience of bodily subjectivity?
3. On the basis of which bodily phenomena does our sense of bodily subjectivity arise?

I began the work of responding to these questions in my dissertation, entitled “Embodiment and Subjectivity: the Origins of Bodily Self-Awareness,” and have since greatly expanded my research to consider various avenues in response to these key questions. Rather than approach these issues from any single direction, my work engages with multiple historical traditions — Phenomenology & Eastern Philosophical traditions — as well as various disciplines — Neuroscience, Psychology, and Cognitive Science.
Address: Department of Philosophy
Illinois State University
Campus Box 4540
Normal IL 61790

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Papers

The Emotional Dimension to Sensory Perception

The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception

This chapter considers how we might understand the effect that emotions have on the justification... more This chapter considers how we might understand the effect that emotions have on the justification of our perceptual beliefs about the world, beliefs that we acquire from a variety of sensory modalities—audition, gustation, olfaction, and so on. The chapter takes the problem to be associated with one of two forms of perceptual influence: penetration or multisensory integration. In any given perceptual moment there are multiple sensory modalities and mental states at play, each affecting the overall experience. Whether we understand the influence of emotion on perception as a form of non-perceptual penetration or a form of non-visual sensory perception of the inner body—interoception—the potential epistemological difficulties remain: How can we be said to acquire justified beliefs and knowledge on the basis of such influenced perceptual experience? As has been the norm, only the five exteroceptive senses of vision, audition, olfaction, taste, and touch are typically discussed in the c...

William James and the Embodied Mind

Contemporary Pragmatism

The hard problem of consciousness lies in explaining what constitutes the subjectivity of conscio... more The hard problem of consciousness lies in explaining what constitutes the subjectivity of consciousness. I argue that significant headway can be made on the problem from an embodied mind view, and particularly if we turn to William James’ theory of emotions. The challenge is one of explaining how bodily subjectivity arises from biological processes. I argue that the solution to this problem lies in our sense of interoception, and James’ theory which suggests emotional feelings are the cascade of changing bodily states. Through James’ account, I show how the biological body can give rise to a bodily subjectivity in experiential consciousness, and thus move towards a solution of the hard problem.

The missing pieces in the scientific study of bodily awareness

Philosophical Psychology

Abstract Research on bodily awareness has focused on body illusions with an aim to explore the po... more Abstract Research on bodily awareness has focused on body illusions with an aim to explore the possible dissociation of our bodily awareness from our own body. It has provided insights into how our sensory modalities shape our sense of embodiment, and it has raised important questions regarding the malleability of our sense of ownership over our own body. The issue, however, is that this research fails to consider an important distinction in how we experience our body. There are indeed two ways in which we can be aware of our body: via observational awareness, which involves attending to the body as an object, and via non-observational awareness, where the body is given as the subject of experience and does not involve attention. The research to date has focused on the former—observational bodily awareness—and has left the latter—non-observational bodily awareness—in the dark. This is detrimental to ever formulating a complete account of how we are aware of our body. It is understandable, however, because of the inherent problem in studying non-observational bodily awareness: how would you instruct subjects to report on their unattended bodily awareness? In view to resolving this problem, I propose here a working hypothesis on the basis of research on interoception and the rubber hand illusion, and on the effect of meditation on awareness and attention. This working hypothesis can show us a way to begin studying non-observational bodily awareness, and finally build a complete theory of bodily awareness.

Lana Kühle

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